SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT

HOSTAGE MANUAL

RM 532.08
POLICY STATEMENT

It is the policy of the Sacramento Police Department to maintain training, policy, and procedure to ensure hostage incidents are handled in a safe and professional manner. Our goal is to save the lives of officers, citizens and suspects involved in these incidents. Additionally, our goal is to minimize the impact these incidents have on the community. With periodic training and reference to this manual, hostage incidents should be easier to control. However, we are aware that there are no guarantees of success while dealing with this type of incident.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE MANUAL

I. APPLICATION
A. The policies/procedures contained in this manual are designed for critical incidents which include, but are not limited to:
1. hostage situations
2. armed, barricaded suspect(s)
3. sniper situations, and
4. armed suicidal subjects (not necessarily barricaded).

B. Definitions
1. Hostage Situation - A situation in which suspects take hostages to:
   a. protect themselves and/or
   b. attempt to force some action on the part of the police.
2. Types of Hostages
   a. Citizens
   b. Police.
3. Types of Hostage Situations
   a. Crimes in progress gone bad
   b. Kidnappings
   c. Political extremists
   d. Individual actions (psychotics).

II. LIMITATIONS
A. This manual is the basis for training.
B. Training must be continuous and practiced to ensure efficient, effective and safe operations.
C. This manual and proper training cannot guarantee success, but will enhance success.

III. GOALS
A. To establish clear, safe, practical, and effective policy and procedures, and to insure continuity and accountability before during and after a hostage situation.
B. To prepare officers to handle hostage situations as safely as possible for all concerned persons.
C. To teach specific operational procedures and negotiation skills for hostage situations.

IV. PHILOSOPHY
A. To save the lives of:
   1. hostages
   2. uninvolved citizens
   3. officers
   4. hostage takers.
B. To control and manage situations to minimize the impact on the rest of the community.
C. To prevent the escape of the hostage taker(s).
D. To seek resolution without use of force whenever possible.
E. To properly conclude hostage situations.
F. To gain knowledge from each situation.

V. ELEMENTS OF POLICY
A. General Principles
B. General Operational Issues
C. Command Responsibility
D. Personnel Deployment
E. Negotiables and Non-negotiables
F. Use of Force
G. Use of Outside Agencies
H. Public Information and Press Relations
I. Training.

CHAPTER II
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The principles provided in this chapter are applicable generally to all hostage takings, and as stated in Chapter I, to situations involving armed, barricaded suspects and/or sniper situations.

I. TACTICAL SYSTEM

II. TIME IS ON YOUR SIDE

B. Time enhances safety for:
   1. hostages
   2. officers
   3. citizens
   4. hostage takers.

C. Time usually costs nothing but the anxieties of action-oriented officers. No movement or action should be forced in a situation which can be more safely handled by using time as an advantage.

D. Most situations with poor outcomes have been the direct result of officers acting impulsively. Most often, a decision was made to rush the scene rather than to contain it.

E. 

F. Time is often the best weapon because it allows officers the following flexibility not afforded to suspects:

G. Time can cause a diminishing dedication to the commitment of political extremists. As the clock ticks away, they have time to consider whether they are prepared to make the supreme sacrifice for their chosen cause.

H. The Stockholm Theory
   1. The longer hostage takers are in contact with hostages, the less likely they are to harm the hostages.
   2. Personal interaction under stress creates quick emotional involvement among people. Hostages may be drawn toward hostage takers.

I. 

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III. DO NOT INCREASE RISKS
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. Do not commit to actions without sufficient personnel or adequate equipment to carry out the mission.

IV. DECISION MAKERS SHALL NOT DIRECTLY NEGOTIATE
A. Decisions on proposals and counter offers shall be made through the negotiation team.
B. This applies regardless of the means of communications between suspects and the negotiation team.
C. 
D. 
E. 

CHAPTER III
GENERAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Operational issues refer to the overall organization, coordination, and management of hostage situations. Negotiations are extremely difficult, if not impossible, if operational issues are not properly handled. Operational issues are designed to implement the tactical system described in Chapter II. Attention to operational issues alone will not necessarily produce a positive resolution. Adequate handling of operational issues demands time and occasionally sufficient time is just not available. Operational issues in this Chapter are presented in the logical sequence for most situations. Each situation is unique and variations often must be made.

I. INITIAL CONTACT
A. Effective and safe response to radio calls indicating hostage situations is critical. Most initial contacts are in response to radio calls.
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 
B. The possibility of a situation deteriorating is extremely high until all resources are in place and the situation is stabilized.
C. The first priority of the first officers on the scene must be to report to the dispatcher, and thus to their superiors, of:
   1. the nature of the situation (hostage taking, etc.).
   2. the location, with specifics about routes other officers should take.
   3. weapons information (if known).
   4. injuries.
D. The second priority is to contain the situation.
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 
E. Standby Emergency Medical Personnel
1. The Fire Department and an ambulance should be requested immediately. Remember, the possibility of a situation deteriorating is highest before stabilization.
2. Their response should be to a safe location immediately outside the danger zone. This location can be changed after the situation is stabilized.

F. Once containment has been affected, further action should wait for adequate personnel and equipment resources.

II. INITIAL AUTHORITY
A. Initial authority rests with the first officer on the scene, regardless of assignment. If several officers arrive at the same time, the senior officer shall assume initial authority.
B. If the initial officer(s) on the scene are not assigned to the Office of Operations (OOO), every effort shall be made to turn operational control over to the OOO at the earliest possible moment.
C. The sector sergeant must be among those officers initially dispatched so as to assume the initial authority whenever possible.
D. Initial authority includes the responsibility to order the response of a SWAT Team and a Negotiations Team. Their response is mandatory.
E. Initial authority includes the responsibility to assess the situation and, as necessary:
   1. ensure that the issues described above (Initial Contact) have been handled.
   2. direct the response of additional field officers.
   3. assign officers to inner perimeter positions.
   4. assign officers to outer perimeter positions.
   5. order the response of special teams, specialist personnel or special equipment. (Refer to those listed on pages 11 and 12).
   6. designate an Incident Command Post (CP) location.
   7. order the delivery of the CP Motorhome.
   8. Serve as the Incident Commander (IC) until relieved.

I Initial authority, ideally vested in the sector sergeant, is necessary to provide adequate responses to individual circumstances. However, when properly executed, initial authority generally extends into the containment stage and allows command level staff to assume authority during the containment stage.

While nothing in this manual, expressed or implied, is intended to limit the authority of any initial officer, neither is anything in this manual intended to circumvent or diminish the requirement that command level staff assume command of a hostage situation. See Chapter IV.

III. STABILIZING HOSTAGE SITUATIONS--LOGISTICAL CONCERNS
Once containment is achieved and sufficient personnel have arrived, the situation can be stabilized and preparations made to begin the negotiation process. The following logistical concerns are:

A. Communications among Police Personnel
   1. All personnel shall be in radio communication.
   2. One (1) radio channel and one (1) dispatcher shall be dedicated to the operation.
   3. 

B. General Personnel Considerations
   1. While it is necessary to have sufficient personnel on hand to deal with the situation, it is critical that the number be limited to those necessary.
   2. All personnel must be under supervision and have definite assignments.
   3. The identity, location, and movement of all personnel must be strictly monitored by the IC and the dispatcher to enable the IC to deploy personnel as needed.

C. General Personnel Deployment
   1. The Outer Perimeter Group - usually officers and Community service officers (CSOs). They:
      a. establish, and maintain safe, a perimeter outside and away from the danger zone.
b. prevent unauthorized personnel and citizens, who may endanger themselves or cause additional problems, from entering the area.
c. detain and identify all persons leaving the area.
d. may refer some persons to the officer(s) gathering intelligence for debriefing or interviews.

D. Special Teams Deployment - These may be either required or simply available, i.e. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team.

E. Specialized Personnel Deployment
1. Detectives
2. Interpreters
3. Crime Scene Investigators (CSI)
4. Police Information Officer (PIO)

F. Specialized Equipment Deployment
1. CP Motorhome
2. Patrol Wagons
3. 4-wheel drive vehicles
6. Negotiations Teams vehicles

G. Allied Agencies Personnel/Equipment Deployment
1. Deputy District Attorneys (DAs)
2. Probation Officers or Parole Agents
3. Helicopters
4. Fire Department lighting, generator, or power tools

IV. THE INCIDENT COMMAND POST (SEE ALSO CHAPTER V)
A. The Incident CP is a strategic position, not to be confused with the CP Motorhome.
B. The Incident CP shall be established as soon as possible, generally as soon as containment is achieved.
C. The location should be:
   1. safe
   2. practical
   3. out of sight of the hostage taker(s).
D. Incident CP Personnel
   1. The IC
   2. The Operations Officer(s)
      a. The Communications Officer
      b. The CP Recorder
   3. The Logistics Officer (at the Area facility)
V. COMMUNICATIONS WITH HOSTAGE TAKERS
   A. Whenever possible, communication with hostage takers shall be made only by trained Department negotiators.
   B. 
      1. 
      2. 
      3. 
      4. 
   C. 

CHAPTER IV
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

As provided in Chapter III, the initial authority over a hostage situation rests with the first or senior officer on the scene and operational control shall shift to the OOO at the earliest possible moment, with the sector sergeant to assume initial authority whenever possible.

It is equally important that a command level officer be placed in charge at the earliest possible moment.

I. INCIDENT COMMANDER – DEFINED
   A. The Watch Commander should respond to and assume command of all hostage situations as the IC.
   B. If unable to immediately respond, an on-duty lieutenant may serve as the IC pending the arrival of the watch commander or higher authority.
   C. The Watch Commander, or designee, shall be briefed by the initial officer before assuming responsibility as the IC.

II. INCIDENT COMMANDER - AUTHORITY
   A. The Watch Commander shall have full authority over the entire operation.
      1. The Watch Commander may issue temporary, emergency orders to any employee.
      2. The Watch Commander may call in off-duty employees.
      3. The Watch Commander may make temporary, emergency use of any Department equipment.
      4. The Watch Commander may establish contact with the Chief of Police (COP) as deemed necessary.
   B. A designated on-duty lieutenant shall acquire such authority through the Watch Commander.

III. INCIDENT COMMANDER - DUTIES
   The IC’s duties are inclusive of all issues and principles expressed in this manual. To the degree possible, the IC shall:
   A. manage the Tactical System by the principles of:
      1. 
      2. 
      3. 
      4. 
   B. manage the situation in such a manner that time works to the advantage of the Department and a positive resolution.
   C. manage the situation in a manner that does not increase risks.
   D. manage news media issues.
   E. ensure personnel issues, including:
      1. adequate numbers
      2. adequate skills
      3. safe deployment
      4. effective deployment
      5. adequate supervision
      6. adequate relief
      7. use of outside agencies.
F. ensure equipment issues, including:
   1. delivery systems
   2. issue systems
   3. safe deployment
   4. effective deployment
   5. service, repair, and replacement
   6. use of outside agencies.

G. ensure adequate and proper communications among employees and with hostage taker(s).

H. manage the Negotiation Team without personally negotiating with the hostage taker(s).

I. as the decision maker for the use of force, manage the Assault Team.
   1.
   2.
   3.

J. direct adequate records keeping to ensure accurate and complete police report preparation and proper concluding procedures. (See Chapter XI).

K. ensure post-situation analysis issues. (See Chapter XII).

IV. CHANGE OF COMMAND
A. The IC shall remain in place for the duration of the situation.
B. When it becomes necessary to replace the IC due to fatigue, the Watch Commander of the oncoming watch (or a designated oncoming lieutenant) shall assume command when briefed by the IC.
C. Generally, if situations last for days, a 12 hour rotation of the two (2) original ICs is desirable.
D. Higher ranking officers who respond to the CP shall serve as observers and/or provide assistance to the IC.
E. Higher ranking officers shall not assume the title of IC unless:
   1. extenuating circumstances exist which the IC has demonstrated an inability to handle or
   2. requested to do so by the IC.
F. An IC who is relieved by a higher ranking officer shall remain at the CP as an aide to the new IC.

CHAPTER V
THE INCIDENT COMMAND POST
As provided in Chapter III, authority to establish an Incident CP may be an appropriate use of initial authority vested in the first officer on the scene or the sector sergeant. As provided in Chapter IV, the IC has final authority over where the Incident CP will be established and its logistical concerns.
I. SELECTING THE LOCATION
A. Safety Issues - The CP must be:
   1.
   2.
   3.

B. Practicality - The CP should be:
   1. accessible to necessary employees.
   2. accessible to delivery of equipment and supplies.
   3. strategic to any necessary utilities.
   4. strategic to any necessary staging area.

C. Visibility - The CP should be out of sight of the hostage taker (s) to:
   1.
   2.
II. DECIDING TO USE THE COMMAND POST MOTORHOME
A. The CP Motorhome is designed and equipped to enhance the capabilities of the IC and shall be used when possible.
B. Extreme circumstances may dictate the use of other Department vehicles or the commandeering of a building.

III. COMMAND POST (CP) VAN OPERATORS
A. A list of properly trained CP van operators shall be maintained by the Communications Divisions. Such operators shall receive quarterly refresher training in the operation of the CP van.
B. An OOO sergeant shall be designated to maintain the van and operators list.

IV. RESTOCKING
At the conclusion of any incident or operation in which the CP van is used, the IC shall ensure it is left in an orderly condition. The CP van shall be clean, free of debris, restocked with supplies depleted, and left in a ready state for it's next use.

CHAPTER VI
STAFFING THE INCIDENT COMMAND POST

As provided in Chapter III, while the total number of personnel used for a hostage taking must be sufficient to deal with the situation, it is critical that the number be limited to those necessary, and that they have adequate supervision and definite assignments.
This principle is especially true for staffing the Incident CP.
As provided in Chapter IV, the IC has total authority over all personnel involved in the operation, and bring any personnel into the operation.
This authority, however, can be best expressed through a limited span of control over specialized functional positions.

I. SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONAL POSITIONS - GENERAL
A. The IC must generally issue all orders through the officers placed in the specialized functional positions.
B. The larger the operation, in terms of numbers of personnel assigned, or the greater the duration of the operation, the more important this principle becomes.
C. The specialized functional positions are placed adjunct to the IC, so as to report to, and receive orders from, only the IC.
D. The IC may fill, supplement and change assignments according to the needs, or changing needs, of the operation.

II. SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONAL POSITION TITLES
A. The Operations Officer
B. The Logistics Officer
C. The Negotiations Team Leader
D. The SWAT Commander.

III. THE OPERATIONS OFFICER (SEE ALSO CHAPTER VII):
A. may be a lieutenant, sergeant, or officer.
B. remains at the Incident CP.
C. becomes known by radio identifier “CP OPERATIONS”.
D. coordinates and reports the efforts or actions of:
   1. the Outer Perimeter Group.
   2. the Intelligence Officer.
   3. the PIO.
   4. allied agency personnel.
E. supervises:
   1. the Command Post Recorder, who:
      a. may be an officer, CSO, or Police Dispatcher.
      b. prepares a chronological report documenting the entire operation.
   2. the CP Communications Officer, who:
      a. may be an officer, CSO, or Police Dispatcher.
      b. becomes known by the radio identifier “CP”.
      c. answers all radio traffic directed to the Incident “CP”:
      d. alerts the IC and the Operations Officer to radio traffic directed to them.
3. CP Motorhome equipment and supplies.
4. equipment and supplies brought to the Incident CP.

IV. THE LOGISTICS OFFICER (SEE ALSO CHAPTER VIII):
A. may be a lieutenant, sergeant, or officer.
B. is located at an Area facility.
C. becomes known by radio identifier “CP LOGISTICS”.
D. coordinates delivery to the Incident CP of whatever equipment or supplies ordered by the IC.
E. Facilitates calling in off-duty personnel as ordered by the IC.

V. THE NEGOTIATIONS TEAM LEADER (SEE ALSO CHAPTER IX):
A. is a designated sergeant or other member of the team.
B. supervises all communication with the hostage taker(s).
C. reports negotiations progress.

VI. THE SWAT COMMANDER (SEE ALSO CHAPTER X):
A. is the Office of Operations Lieutenant assigned SWAT responsibilities, or SWAT Team Sergeant.
B. 
C. 
D. readies the SWAT Team(s) for any necessary use of force.

CHAPTER VII
THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
As provided in Chapter VI, the Operations Officer is placed in a specialized functional position adjunct to the IC. The Operations Officer assumes the radio identifier “CP OPERATIONS” and handles critical time-consuming tasks, and thus affords the IC more time to deal with the Negotiations Team Leader and SWAT Commander.

The Operations Officer reports to, and receives orders from, only the IC. The Operations Officer is selected by the IC and, depending on availability, may be a lieutenant, sergeant, or officer.

For most situations, the sector sergeant is the best selection. The sector sergeant will typically be the officer most knowledgeable of the situation when the IC arrives, and will be the officer briefing and relinquishing initial authority to the IC.

The sector sergeant will also generally be familiar with the environment and demographics of the neighborhood. The sector sergeant will also know of any unique personnel among the first responding officers, such as a Phase I recruit or a bilingual officer.

I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The Operations Officer coordinates and reports the efforts or actions of:
   1. the Outer Perimeter Group
   2. the Intelligence Officer
   3. the PIO
   4. allied agency personnel.
B. The Operations Officer supervises the:
   1. CP Recorder
   2. CP Communications Officer
   3. CP Motorhome stocked equipment/supplies and equipment/supplies brought to the Incident CP.

II. COORDINATION WITH THE OUTER PERIMETER GROUP
A. The Outer Perimeter Group will normally be in place by the time the Operations Officer is appointed.
B. Ideally, the Outer Perimeter Group will have been placed by the sector sergeant, who will become the Operations Officer.
C. Officers supervising the Perimeter Group report to the IC through the Operations Officer.
D. The IC delivers orders to those supervisors through the Operations Officer.
E. In small operations, the Operations Officer may supervise the Outer Perimeter Group.
F. The Operations Officer must:
   1. assess whether the personnel deployed on the outer perimeter, and their positions, are either adequate or over staffed, either by observation or by interviewing Perimeter Group personnel or supervisors.
2. Report this finding to the IC to enable the IC to appropriately allocate personnel resources.

G. The Operations Officer coordinates relief for personnel on the perimeter.

H. The Operations Officer coordinates delivery of persons, identified as informative by Perimeter Group personnel, to the Intelligence Officer.

III. COORDINATION WITH THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

A. The IC will generally direct the Operations Officer to appoint the Intelligence Officer.

B. It may be necessary to appoint a team of officers to gather intelligence.

C. The Intelligence Officer, or team leader, reports to the IC through the Operations officer.

D. The IC delivers orders to the Intelligence Officer through the Operations Officer.

E. The IC may direct the Intelligence Officer to report directly to the Negotiations Team.

(SEE ALSO CHAPTER IX).

IV. COORDINATION WITH THE POLICE INFORMATION OFFICER

A. An order from the IC that the PIO respond to the Incident CP is usually given through the Operations Officer, who must ensure delivery of the order.

B. The Operations Officer recommends the site for the media to gather, and upon approval of the IC, directs the PIO to that location.

C. The Operations Officer briefs the PIO and relays information to and from the IC.

V. COORDINATION WITH ALLIED AGENCY PERSONNEL

A. Because Department policy is to assume full responsibility for a hostage situation which occurs in our jurisdiction, the Operations Officer must:

1. Inform the IC regarding any deployment of officers from allied agencies.

2. As directed by the IC, coordinate the replacement of officers from allied agencies with officers of our Department.

B. Deployment of officers from allied agencies is sometimes necessary, such as a request that the California Highway Patrol close a freeway.

C. In either instance, supervisors of allied agencies report to the IC through the Operations Officer, so as to allow the IC to tend to more urgent matters.

VI. SUPERVISION OF THE COMMAND POST RECORDER

A. The IC will generally direct the Operations Officer to appoint the CP Recorder.

B. The CP Recorder should be a CSO, whenever available, but may be an officer or Police Dispatcher.

C. The CP Recorder reports to the IC through the Operations Officer.

D. The IC delivers orders to the CP Recorder through the Operations Officer.

E. The CP Recorder prepares and maintains a chronological report documenting the entire operation, including, but not limited to:

1. Arrival times of personnel and equipment

2. When assignments are given and to whom

3. When equipment is issued and to whom

4. When significant events occur and their description

5. When significant issues arise and their description

6. When significant decisions are made.

VII. SUPERVISION OF THE COMMAND POST COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER

A. The IC generally directs the Operations Officers to appoint the CP Communications Officer.

B. The CP Communications Officer should be a CSO, whenever available, but may be an officer or Police Dispatcher.

C. The CP Communications Officer reports to the IC through the Operations Officer.

D. The IC delivers orders to the CP Communications Officer through the Operations Officer.

E. The CP Communications Officers adopts the radio identifier “CP” and:

1. Answers all radio traffic directed to the Incident CP.

2. Alerts the IC, the Operations Officer, and others to unanswered radio traffic directed to them.

3. Makes broadcasts to all officers involved in the operation and asks the dispatcher to repeat them, as necessary.

VIII. SUPERVISION OF COMMAND POST VAN EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
A. The Operations Officer ensures that equipment on board the motorhome remains in good working order during the operation.

B. The Operations Officer ensures the adequate supply of note pads, report forms, pens, pencils, maps, batteries, and bulbs and directs delivery of goods and replacement items, as needed.

IX. SUPERVISION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES BROUGHT TO THE INCIDENT COMMAND POST

A. The Operations Officer ensures that equipment delivered to the Incident CP remains in good working order during the operation.

B. The Operations Officer, in coordination with the Logistics Officer, ensures that equipment borrowed from other city departments or other agencies is returned, repaired or replaced, as necessary.

CHAPTER VIII
THE LOGISTICS OFFICER

As provided in Chapter VI, the Logistics Officer is placed in a specialized functional position adjunct to the IC. The Logistics Officer assumes the radio identifier “CP LOGISTICS” and remains at, or reports to, an Area facility to coordinate delivery of equipment and supplies to the Incident CP and/or the calling in of off-duty employees.

The Logistics Officer reports to, and receives orders from, only the IC, but coordinates and cooperates with the Operations Officer, the Negotiations Team Leader, and the SWAT Commander. The Logistics Officer is selected by the IC and, depending on availability, may be a lieutenant, sergeant or officer.

I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Logistics Officer ensures delivery of:
   1. vehicles
   2. special equipment (door ram, etc.)
   3. chemical agents
   4. extra or special ammunition
   5. extra radios or batteries
   6. food and drinks.
      a. The OOO maintains open purchase orders with grocery stores and restaurants.
      b. The Department Petty Cash Fund may be utilized for purchases or reimbursement.

B. The Logistics Officer facilitates the:
   1. call-up of off-duty personnel and
   2. their transportation to the Incident CP.

C. The Logistics Officer, in coordination with the operations officer, ensures the return of vehicles and equipment to ready status.

D. The Logistics Officer, in coordination with the Operations Officer, ensures the return of any vehicles or equipment borrowed from other City departments or allied agencies.

II. DELIVERY OF VEHICLES

A. The CP Motorhome

B. The armored car (as directed by the SWAT Commander or IC).

NOTE: These vehicles shall be driven only by personnel previously deemed qualified by the OOO (See Chapter V).

C. As necessary, the Logistics Officer coordinates efforts with:
   1. Public Safety Garage personnel
   2. the Department Fleet Manager (who may be called in).

III. CALL-UP OF OFF-DUTY PERSONNEL

A. Uniformed officers
   1. The OOO maintains a call-up roster for officers assigned to the watches.
   2. Officers on days off from the affected watch are generally to be called in first.
   3. Depending on the hour and expected duration of the situation, officers scheduled to report for the next shift may be called in early.
B. The Logistics Officer assists, as necessary, in calling off-duty specialist employees, and/or in readying equipment for them.

IV. TRANSPORTATION FOR CALL-UP PERSONNEL
A. The on-duty commander of the County Jail can arrange a bus and driver.
B. Patrol Wagons are available.
C. Various Departments vans can be used.

CHAPTER IX
THE NEGOTIATIONS TEAM LEADER

As provided in Chapter I, the Department's policy and procedures in a hostage situation are based, in part, on a philosophy to save lives and to seek resolution without the use of force whenever possible.

Because experience has proven that negotiation is the best method to save lives and avoid the use of force, it must be attempted whenever possible. The Negotiations Team shall be called in to all hostage, sniper or armed, barricaded subject situations. Team members are listed in the CAD system, along with call-up instructions for members who are off-duty. As provided in Chapter III, the officer assuming Initial Authority must order the response of the Negotiations Team. Consideration shall be given to the availability of on duty negotiators, as well as those on-call. Time is of the essence, therefore response delays must be minimized.

Officers should note all demands, and any intelligence provided by the hostage taker. Officers should advise the hostage taker that he or she is not authorized to make decisions or grant demands.

Negotiations must be conducted only by a thoroughly trained team of officers.

As provided in Chapter VI, the Negotiations Team Leader is placed in a specialized functional position adjunct to the IC. The Negotiations Team is a preselected group of specially trained officers. This manual is not intended to train the Negotiations Team, nor does it purport to reflect all the training the Negotiations Team receives. This chapter is meant to provide general information about the purpose, capabilities, and responsibilities of the Negotiations Team.

I. THE NEGOTIATIONS TEAMS
A. At full strength, a Negotiations Team consists of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Team Leader/Liaison</td>
<td>Negotiator 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Primary Negotiator</td>
<td>Negotiator 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secondary Negotiator</td>
<td>Negotiator 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>Negotiator 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. At less than full strength, the duties and responsibilities of each member shall be assumed by the other members as necessary to the particular situation.
C. A complement of 2 members is considered minimum staffing.

II. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The Team Leader:
The Team Leader shall facilitate the negotiations by designing strategies based on frequent consultation with the IC, SWAT Commander, and the Negotiation Team.

B. The Primary Negotiator:
The Primary Negotiator shall secure direct communication with the hostage taker. The Primary Negotiator's primary duties shall include, but not be limited to:
1. ensuring the safety of all concerned
2. forging a team effort aimed at resolving the hostage situation

C. The Secondary Negotiator
The Secondary Negotiator shall:
1. monitor the on-going negotiations
2. perform record keeping functions
3. operate tape recording equipment.

D. The Intelligence Officer
The Intelligence Officer shall be a negotiator trained in securing information from many sources. Information obtained by the Intelligence Officer shall be shared by the IC, Team Leader, Negotiators, and the SWAT Commander.

E. The team members are cross-trained to be functional in each area of responsibility.

F. The Negotiations Teams are trained together so team members will be functional on any team.

III. NEGOTIATIONS TEAM EQUIPMENT

The CP Motorhome is stocked with specialized equipment for the Negotiations Team.

IV. METHODS OF COMMUNICATION WITH HOSTAGE TAKERS

A. Communications with hostage takers must be **private** if at all possible.

B. Telephones are generally the best medium.
   1. Standard telephones, if available to the hostage takers, are preferred.
   2. Officers using cellular telephones must consider that they may be monitored.
   3. Portable, direct line telephone equipment is available, but there are risks in delivering the equipment to hostage takers.
   4. 
      a. training aids
      b. 
      c. 
      d. 

C. Police radios and amplified sound equipment are less desirable.

D. 

V. SOME PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATIONS

A. 

B. 
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

C. Negotiators attempt to verify the number and identity of hostages and hostage takers.
   1. Names
   2. Histories

D. Negotiators attempt to verify or determine what weapons hostage takers possess.

E. Negotiators attempt to verify or determine the physical condition and/or medical needs of hostages and hostage takers.

F. Negotiators attempt to determine the desires or demands of hostage takers.

G. 

H. 

VI. COMMUNICATING ACTIONS TO ALL OFFICERS

A. 
   1. 
   2. 
   3. 

B. This remains true whether **or not** such movement is:
   1. agreed to and/or
   2. the result of negotiation.
VII. NEGOTIABLES AND NON-NEGOTIABLES
A. The Department shall not:
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

B. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

C. 

D. 

CHAPTER X
THE SWAT COMMANDER

As provided in Chapter I, the Department’s policy and procedures in a hostage situation are based, in part, on a philosophy to minimize the impact on the rest of the community and not allow the escape of hostage takers.

Experience has proven that officers deployed to the Inner Perimeter Team and the Assault Team must be highly trained specialists. Members of the SWAT Teams are given such specialized training and, therefore, shall be called in to all hostage, sniper, and armed, barricaded suspect situations. As provided in Chapter III, the supervisor assuming authority must order the response of a SWAT Team.

Ideally, regular field officers initially assigned to containment positions will be replaced by a SWAT Team(s) as the Inner Perimeter Team and Assault Team.

As provided in Chapter VI, the SWAT Commander shall provide technical support to the IC and is placed in a specialized functional position adjunct to the IC. The SWAT Commander shall be the Officer of Operations Lieutenant assigned SWAT responsibilities, or a SWAT Team Sergeant.

Depending on the tactical issues and number of officers or teams deployed, the SWAT Commander may directly supervise all officers or may relay orders through team leaders.

This manual is not intended to train the SWAT Teams, nor does it purport to reflect all the training these teams receive. This chapter is meant to provide general information about the purpose, capabilities and responsibilities of these teams.

I. THE SWAT TEAMS

B. At less than full strength, the duties and responsibilities of each member shall be assumed by the other SWAT Team members as necessary to the particular situation.

C. 

D. The team members are cross-trained to be functional in more than one (1) area of responsibility.
E. The SWAT teams train together so team members will be functional on any team.

II. EQUIPMENT
A. The SWAT teams carry specialized equipment and weapons, including when off duty in an On-Call status.
B. The SWAT Team van and armored car contain specialized equipment and weapons.
C. Delivery of these vehicles should be as requested by the SWAT Commander.

CHAPTER XI
CONCLUDING PROCEDURES

The resolution of a hostage situation, whether it is the surrender of the suspects or something less desirable, must be followed by proper concluding procedures. Resolution must never be considered the final stage of a hostage situation.

The more people involved in the operation, the greater its duration, or the more dramatic or tragic its resolution, the more important the principles of proper conclusion become.

Without established concluding procedures, details can be easily overlooked and responsibilities can be confused. The unfortunate result may be that, despite an otherwise outstanding operation, justice somehow will not be served.

The IC shall ensure a proper conclusion by outlining needs and planning the conclusion as the situation develops. Sufficient personnel to accomplish identified tasks shall be arranged and specific assignments acknowledged and logged.

All persons involved in the operation, (hostages, victims, officers and suspects), shall be accounted for and properly handled. Evidence shall be documented and secured. All equipment and supplies used shall be returned, restocked and/or made ready for service.

I. HOSTAGES OR OTHER VICTIMS
A. Each shall be accounted for.
B. If any are injured, first aid or hospitalization shall be obtained.
C. Assignments shall be acknowledged and logged as to who will debrief them and where.
D. Assignments to interview them for police reports shall be acknowledged and logged.
E. Needs for any to remain at the scene shall be determined.
F. Detectives may be required.

II. OFFICERS/EMPLOYEES
A. Each must be accounted for.
B. If any are injured, first aid or hospitalization shall be obtained and Department policy shall be followed.
C. Needs for any to remain at their positions or elsewhere at the scene shall be identified.
   1. Will they need relief?
   2. Will the relieving employees need instruction?
D. Employees who may return to regular duties shall be identified.
E. Assignments shall be acknowledged and logged.

III. SUSPECTS
A. Each shall be accounted for.
B. Needs to identify, locate, interview or arrest outstanding suspects shall be determined.
C. If any are injured, first aid, or hospitalization shall be obtained.
D. Transportation
   1. The method (car or ambulance) shall be determined.
   2. The destination (Main Jail, Detective Division, which hospital) shall be ordered or determined.
   3. Sufficient officers and/or chase cars shall be assigned.
E. Interview assignments shall be acknowledged and logged.
   1. Are Detectives required?
   2. Where will they be interviewed?
F. Arrest Processing assignments shall be acknowledged and logged.
   1. Booking officers shall be given specific criminal charges and other Arrest Report information.
   2. Felony Blood Alcohol/Urine tests shall be given.
IV. EVIDENCE
   A. Search Warrant requirements shall be determined.
      1. Are Detectives required?
      2. Will the scene need to be posted?
   B. CSI and/or Identification Unit processing needs shall be determined
   C. Assignments shall be acknowledged and logged for the:
      1. finder
      2. recorder
      3. collector
      4. booking officer.

V. SUSPECT VEHICLES
   A. Towing, storing, or impounding needs shall be determined.
   B. Search issues shall be resolved.
   C. Assignments shall be acknowledged and logged.

VI. THE SCENE
   A. If the actions of suspects or officers rendered the premises uninhabitable, needs to
      secure or post it shall be determined.
   B. Need for evidence processing shall be determined.
   C. Need to locate an owner or agent shall be determined.

VII. DISPLACED PERSONS
   A. If the actions of suspects or officers displaced persons from their homes, needs to
      provide transportation, to locate family or provide lodging shall be determined.
   B. Resources include the Department, other City Departments and public service agencies.

VIII. VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT
   A. Record keeping during the operation is critical to returning, restocking and making ready
      all equipment and vehicles used.
   B. Refer to Chapter VII regarding the duties of the Operations Officer.
   C. Refer to Chapter VIII regarding the duties of the Logistics Officer.
   D. Specific assignments must be acknowledged and logged.

IX. POLICE REPORTS
   A. Record keeping during the operation is critical to ensure that all reportable instances and
      issues are properly documented in police reports.
   B. Actions of allied agencies must be coordinated.
   C. Specific assignments must be acknowledged and logged.
   D. Completed police reports must be collected, organized, and compared against the logs
      maintained during the operation to ensure that all necessary data is recorded.

CHAPTER XII
AFTER-ACTION REPORT AND DEBRIEFING

The best education and training available is self-analysis of how effectively we applied proven
tactics and strategies during an actual incident.
Each incident involving a hostage taking, an armed, barricaded suspect, or a sniper will provide
a wealth of knowledge. We must profit from each incident and continue to improve.

I. THE POST-SITUATION ANALYSIS DEBRIEFING (Refer to General Order 532.13)
   A. The Deputy Chief, OOO, shall cause a debriefing of all incidents in which an Incident CP
      was established to manage:
      1. a hostage taking
      2. an armed, barricaded suspect
      3. a sniper.
   B. The IC shall be the coordinator of the debriefing.
   C. The IC shall prepare an agenda for distribution at the debriefing, and attach to it:
      1. all records and logs prepared by employees assigned to the incident
      2. all police reports of the incident, including follow-up reports and, as applicable,
      results of actions taken by the DA
      3. all CAD system call history printouts and tape recordings of the operation.
   D. The IC shall both provide analysis and constructive criticism at the debriefing.
E. The IC shall solicit analysis and constructive criticism from those attending the debriefing.

II. ATTENDANCE AT THE DEBRIEFING

A. Attendance shall be required of:
   1. the IC.
   2. the SWAT Commander.
   3. the Negotiations Team Leader, Head and Assistant Negotiator, and Coordinator.
   4. the Operations Officer.
   5. the Logistics Officer.
   6. all officers who assumed initial authority.
   7. the Communications Division Manager or a designated Supervising Dispatcher.
   8. the Dispatcher(s) dedicated to the incident.
   9. the detective supervisor most knowledgeable of any actions taken by detectives during the operation, or a designated detective.
   10. the detective supervisor most knowledgeable of any follow-up investigation, or a designated detective.

B. The IC may invite all employees who participated in the incident in any significant way.

C. Other employees who participated in the operation may attend.

D. Other employees with significant interest in such operations may attend.

III. THE DEBRIEFING REPORT

A. The IC shall prepare a full written report of the debriefing.

B. The report shall contain, but is not limited to:
   1. a synopsis of the incident
   2. identified problem areas
   3. constructive criticism presented at the debriefing
   4. recommendations of tactics or strategies for future operations.

C. The report shall be distributed to:
   1. the COP
   2. the Deputy Chief, OOO
   3. the Deputy Chief, Office of Investigations (OOI)
   4. all captains and lieutenants in the OOO
   5. the Communications Division Manager
   6. the SWAT Commander
   7. the Negotiations Team Leader and Hostage Negotiator Coordinator
   8. the PSU
   9. other employees or agencies as deemed appropriate by the IC or higher authority.